THE Fighting Illini

By Army Lt. Matt Spartz

Editor’s note: Army Lt. Matt Spartz, a lifelong Lombard resident, was deployed to Afghanistan in May with the 101st Airborne Division. A 2008 journalism graduate of University of Illinois, he is submitting occasional reports for the Daily Herald.

Walking out the gate of an outpost for the first time is what I imagine an inmate feels like during his first steps outside of prison; a more literal translation may paint the American outpost more like freedom and the war zone I walked into as more like the prison. But my first time stepping “outside the wire was like waking up to the sunny dawn after a rainstorm.

Finally I was leaving the shadow of dirt-filled, wire Hesco barriers that surround and protect combat outposts. Although I’ve been in Afghanistan for five months, it felt like this was my first day actually in the country. I found myself walking down a regular street next to a field being harvested in the distance. Kids were playing on a blue and white-striped swing set hidden beneath a shady grove. Without the M4 rifle in my hands and the body armor soaking up the warm autumn, I could have been strolling through the Illinois countryside.

I’ve gone from being an artillery platoon leader to being the fire support officer for an infantry company. Instead of overseeing my platoon firing howitzer cannons to support the infantry, I’m now the infantry commander’s expert on planning artillery and air assets for his missions. The lieutenant I’m shadowing who will go on to lead the beloved platoon I trained and fought with for 18 months.

While I shadow his job, our first big task is to meet with the local Afghan official who runs the civil projects I’ll soon be managing.

This official’s reputation is for being one of the few honest Afghans who can set deadlines, stay on budget and keep people accountable. He served us Mountain Dew – his favorite drink – and packaged banana cakes. As the midmorning meeting went on we were brought the usual fare: dishes of chickpeas, raisins (stems included), a portion of an unknown, aquamarine seed with a flowery taste and a spicy mix of crunchy chips. The chai tea was the same tint as Mountain Dew, with heaping spoons of large-grain sugar.

Unlike the reputation of the usual Middle Eastern business meeting, ours consisted of nearly all business talk with what seemed like tangible results. We followed up on the election of the local development shura, and laid out plans for multiple projects. Our interpreter is so fluent in American slang he regularly drops the “F-bomb in perfect context when referring to the Taliban, and can convey our jokes in Pashto to get the entire group laughing.

This meeting will take place weekly in my new job and probably will seem very trivial to some. But that day I left the typical American comfort zone. I connected with regular Afghans working to better their homeland, putting into place the actionable arm of American diplomacy. Here, hope exists to make an impact on the lives of real, poor and war-torn people. Here, and in thousands of these shuras across Afghanistan, over sugary chai with handwritten contracts stamped with purple finger prints, is where the war against extremism will be won.

Times like these makes me feel bad about any time thinking down on this country and these people. If one official like this exists, there must be thousands more. If one exists, there’s a chance this mission will succeed.

Copyright © 2010 Paddock Publications, Inc. All rights reserved.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

First off, big ups to my main man Starbuck for his shout-out today. Sir, I’ve been following your blog for awhile, and it’s pretty cool to get that kind of exposure since we can’t rely on print media ::cough:: Spartz! ::cough::

Starbuck’s post on The Lessons of a New Generation [of Army leadership] is worth taking a look at, as it certainly related to a conversation I had with my commander not too long ago. What will happen next in our Army? Granted, every year we lose ironman leaders who probably sympathize with something I recently heard in the Troop:

“We’re war babies…they won’t let us stay. This garrison sh**, we’re just not built for it.”

So where does the current generation of LTs fit into all of this? We enlisted or began our officer education during a time of war. We were told every year by our seasoned, combat-vet cadre, “It’s not a matter of if you go, but when you go.” And now, here we are. Some of us aren’t slated to deploy. Some are in Afghanistan already, some in Iraq. If we stay in, it will be up to our generation to reset the Army after at least a decade of persistent conflict.

Gentlemen, what say you? What are our priorities?

My priorities:

• Refine the way we develop and retain officers.
• Identify talented individuals and develop them into strategic thinkers.

Editor’s Note: Army Lt. Matt Spartz, a lifelong Lombard resident, is a 2008 journalism graduate of University of Illinois. He recently was deployed to Afghanistan with the 101st Airborne Division. From there, he will be submitting occasional reports for the Daily Herald.

The real problem with the war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with rogue generals or defunct, grandiose policy. The real problem has nothing to do with finding the Magic Solution and extolling COIN (counter insurgency) to the far corners of Asia. The real problem is whether the U.S. can decide that the cause is worth doing whatever it takes to finish.

We can “win.” We can make Afghanistan a better place for its citizens. We will come home. But it’s going to take time and money. Do we have enough of both? Yes, if we decide to do whatever it takes.

Some say “bomb ‘em to hell!” and others say we should leave them to their own devices.

Despite U.S. presence, life as usual goes on in the Kunar Valley while a thunderstorm rolls over the mountains.

But we cannot afford to lose sight of the reasoning behind the war. Our nation was attacked by a defined group of terrorists, one that continues to threaten violence within our borders. Unlike previous conflicts directed against the U.S., this group is not a recognized nation or formal coalition. But that does not mean we can afford to ignore them.

People should not confuse the pursuit of the utmost legal, proportionate, and moral action against these “new” threats as weakness, or the inability to overcome a nonstate militia movement. Could we use the extreme, violent tactics of Sherman to wipe out all opposition to the iron will of the U.S.? Of course. If the Taliban et al had a recognizable military, it would be decommissioned by the unrivaled force of joint U.S. military might in less than a week.

Could we button up our borders and hang a “closed” sign on the Statue of Liberty? We sure could, and with units like the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions at the border, Arizona would cease to have an immigration problem.
But we’re better than that. We know the only way to win a moral battle for justice is to take the moral high ground, the classic warfare equivalent of key terrain. The issue is not can we beat the Taliban, but do we have the combined moral wherewithal to do what is necessary in an asymmetrical war of morally right vs. morally wrong.

Regardless of how we got here or why, to think it unworthy to squash a group that bombs its own people, sprays acid in the faces of girls for attending school and uses public hangings and brainwashed human explosives to instill terror is to question all of human morality.

I’m not saying the U.S. has to go in and oust every questionable regime in the world. But there are times in history when a precedent can be set; the pursuit of justice cannot have a price tag. It would be dubious to think during World War II anyone would suggest ways to win the war by spending less, deploying less, and fighting less.

Yes, the U.S. seems to be dabbling in some gray areas, like using unmanned drones for interstate targeted killings. But as the United Nations’ “Report on Targeted Killings” has stated, the international community at large has yet to explicitly state what is black and white in the usage of this new technology and power.

As counter insurgency expert T.E. Lawrence prophetically wrote, learning to fight in this war is like learning to “eat soup with a knife.”

Is the goal of Islamic extremists to have a stable, peaceful Afghanistan? No, it is to destroy Western influence, and the West itself, if necessary. If coalition troops leave Afghanistan will all of our domestic problems go away, and we’ll all be safe and cozy once again? We thought so before Sept. 11, 2001. And the Underwear Bomber is only another example of why we need not think so comfortably from podiums and ballot boxes.

Perhaps it’s not time for people to ask what victory in Afghanistan can do for us, but what else can we do to bring victory to Afghanistan. And in turn, victory for what is right.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

It seems to me that after eight years of war there are still problematic and catastrophic misconceptions of what we now call “modern warfare,” or in today’s more accurate sense, counter insurgency. With GEN McChrystal focusing the mission in Afghanistan to population-centric counter insurgency and further restricting the ROE, a lot of arm chair generals are questioning our tactics. Not only are they asking the wrong questions, but they’re not even sure of the problems.

My initial disclaimer is that I have yet to get my own first-hand experience. However I think everyone should at least try to know what the big-picture problems are, and have some idea of how to accomplish the mission we are being asked to do.

Recently our troops pulled out of the Korengal Valley in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. It was known as “Death Valley” and over 40 Soldiers were killed defending what was considered a strategic valley in the previous counter terrorism campaign; the valley was seen as a foot hold to harbor and launch terrorists and attacks across the country. Now, the US mission has shifted to counter insurgency, with a focus on doing the most good for larger population centers. Once these peace footholds, if you will, are established, we can help the Afghans spread the peace for themselves.

Many people are claiming this exfil from Death Valley is a sign of defeat, and surely the Taliban would claim the same. It’s been said the Russians only got to the mouth of this valley, and that once we took it we never stopped fighting for it. But does that mean it is because the Taliban beat us?

But here is an excerpt from the last commander in Korangel, as reported by The Washington Post:

But Moretti had been avoiding the Afghan as a way to pressure him into greater cooperation.

“You are the only American commander I have known who refuses to see me,” Khan said in Pashto, his face just inches from Moretti’s. “You are the only one who doesn’t sit at the weekly shura. Why?”

“The shura is a waste of time,” Moretti replied. “All we talk about is dead goats. In 10 months, the meetings haven’t accomplished a single thing.”

He and Khan argued in circles for the next 15 minutes about the violence in the valley before Moretti cut the conversation short.

“I know there are big plans for an attack on one of my bases,” he said. “I want to hear about it.” In exchange for information, Moretti promised to start meeting again with Khan.

Khan weighed the offer and then said, “I don’t know anything.”

The next time Moretti’s men made there way to this village, they were hit by an IED. In my opinion this is a frustrating breach of counter insurgency 101, guilty of both hubris and ethnocentrism. In 10 months all they talked about is goats? I’m pretty sure in the last 10 months in the US all we’ve talked about is Universal Health Care, and the immigration lobbyists are just as disgruntled as CPT Moretti.

Some of us still do not really, intrinsically, understand that to accomplish our counter insurgency mission we must operate in the framework of Afghan society, not US norms.

McChrystal said our troops in Korengal were “an irritant to the people.” In our modern warfare this, not retreat, is what we should consider a defeat. What can we do to wholeheartedly support the local population we are operating in? Should we all be living in FOBs with Burger King and satellite internet while the average Afghan is an illiterate subsistence farmer? These are the questions more commanders need to ask themselves.

As one of my combat-tested friends says, “All you have to do is know how to be a human being. Make friends with ‘em. The problem is not everyone (in the Army) knows how to be a decent human being.”

I’m not saying these Soldiers and Officers don’t know how to be decent humans, I just think my friend’s quote is to the point in his dark, humorous way. Moretti may be the last commander there, but the outcome in that valley was not solely on him. Many commanders came before him, and I’m sure many of them tried to fight their way into the people’s hearts.

Those of us who began our military careers after the start of OEF and OIF, and especially after the 2007 surge in Iraq, should know better. We’ve been ingrained with the tenants of dealing with local populations and the ideas of “non-kinetic fires” and “winning hearts and minds.”

But we need to take these things to the next level. I’m currently reading “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One” by David Kilcullen. His argument is that terrorists are like the Immortals from Ancient Persia — you can’t kill enough of them to win the fight. Terrorists in these small wars don’t fight for grand ideological victories, such as Jihad or an Islamic Caliphate. These are farmers and craftsman who find themselves in a position to fight on their own lands for money, security, or out of fear. By not focusing on the native people of the lands we stomp around on, we are only creating more “enemy combatants.”

There have even been examples of Afghans fighting US forces out of boredom. There was fighting going on in a nearby valley and the residents had nothing better to do in life than take a few pop shots.

When we try to push past the people we are trying to help succeed in life, we are pushing past the true objective. Sure, fighting will take place and we must be proficient in small unit tactics. But we need to continually ask how we can minimize our own fighting and maximize soft power. The troops in Korengal left a bunch of fuel for the locals to use once we left. Good idea. We simply left it there, and once we left the true Jihadists in the area took control of it. Bad idea. Maybe we should have physically distributed it to those villagers? Perhaps we should have done that in the first place. Then when the Korengalis got used to hot water and constantly running generators, they would have helped force out the true terrorists from Death Valley.

I hope more of us can maintain a creative approach to our mission in Afghanistan and continue to take the initiative to solving the big war, our own small wars at a time.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

To spark some conversation, I’d like to turn your attentions to a study being done by the Strategic Studies Institute, which I believe I may have mentioned before.

“The Future of the U.S. Army Officer Corps” was started last year to review the shortcomings, and to suggest improvements, in the pipeline of officer recruiting, retaining, assessing, and employing. I’ve been following it on and off for a bit now. The most recent session (closing today) is on “Assessing Talent.”

Watch the videos by some BAMF Generals, active and retired. Then read the paper, and perhaps a few of the others. Here are some points I’d like to talk about that I believe is very relevant to us.

[I'd also like those interested to start your own post in response, and we can then comment on each person's article to make it easier to read.]

LTG Freakly:

General question: Does there exist a professionalism in the junior officer corps? Does introspection and aspiration exist in the ranks on a daily basis?

Talks about being honest with officers: not everyone will command a battalion, not everyone will be a colonel. But the promise of development in personal strengths and the fact that the army needs persons with those strengths, as a tool to incentivize retainment. Is this happening at the LT level?

MG Bartell:

“3 of 10 American’s between the ages 17 to 24 even qualify for military service, not to mention to be officers”

LTG(R) Christman:

He claims that the most influential person on a junior officer is his battalion commander and field grades in his battalion. The inability of the army to effectively “vet and cull” the ineffective field grades will lead/is leading to attrition of junior officers. How has your field grades influenced your career thus far, and your outlook to the future?

Report:

As shown by the dots in Figure 7 (reading right to left), accessions were relatively constant in the 1990s, but have climbed steadily since 2000. As a result, the Army has significantly more company grade officers than it has structure to employ them. This creates a lengthy queue for platoon leader positions and forces the Army to reduce the amount of time that an officer spends in key and  developmental positions. Not surprisingly, this leads to decreased satisfaction and impairs the Army’s ability to retain talent.

Have your expectations of what your duties and responsibilities would be been met? How has that affected your career outlook?

They have much less direct exposure to the military than previous generations of young people, 20 most of whom had vicarious contact with millions of World War II or Cold War-era service veterans.  In the absence of such a direct connection, they must rely on popular culture, movies, television, or the internet for information regarding Army officer service. If the Army fails to provide accurate and  easily assimilated information about officership, prospect impressions may be unduly shaped by the wealth of incomplete, dated, or skewed information available from thousands of media sources.

Is your life and job as a lieutenant what you expected it to be? How is it different?

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

I am starting this post for two reasons; first to start getting the ball rolling on our collective think take of good ideas and *complaints*, and second because I have been thinking about this topic since I have moved from a platoon leader position to staff.

As a platoon leader with a company commander in a unit with a definite chain of command (i.e. Squad Leaders, PSG, PL, 1SG, Commander…etc) the general unwritten rule has been that first names were not used except between the same ranks.  I have also been led to believe that NCO’s never use each other’s first names, especially while on duty.  Even though my PSG was my right hand man, I never used his first name when addressing him.  My Commander never used first names when talking to the PL’s, mainly because it showed poor command.  However, it seems once you become an O4 or higher, using first names becomes more common, even when addressing CPT’s and LT’s.

Also, I noticed that members of Battalion and above staff sections use each other’s first name frequently across ranks or towards subordinates (NCO’s still don’t use first names).  Is there a correlation that most O3/O4′s are at staff level and get into the habit of using first names and then they carry that on to their battalion command if they get one?

I would like to see everyone’s thoughts or opinions on using first names as officers.  A couple of questions to think about:

Does using first names between a Commander and his Platoon Leaders show a lack of customs and courtesy, and does it negatively effect good order?

Should officers address each other with first names in front of NCO’s and subordinates, or does it reflect poor discipline in the Officers Corps?

Due to the nature of the close working relationship amongst staff officers in a Staff Section, does it make it ok to use first names?

I know of a few Battalion Commanders that prefer to call officers at all levels below them (sometimes above) by their first names, is this their attempt to try showing a sense of closeness/attachment at a personal level to their officers by addressing them by a name that’s not on their uniform? Are they trying to indicate that they know you by more than just a velco tag stuck to you? Does it make anyone uncomfortable? (Personally, from my experience so far, i’m still not adjusted to being referred to by my first name from a superior.)