THE Fighting Illini

We’ve had a little back-and-forth lately on Operation New Dawn, what it means for us on the ground, and what it means for Iraq.

From Danger Room:

“It’s not clear how rapidly the U.S. will pull those troops out of Iraq ahead of the full December 2011 withdrawal. But for the time being, “in terms of a purely train-and-advise [mission] for a military that’s got its feet on ground, it does seem to be a whole lot,” says Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College.

Adds retired Major General Paul Eaton, who served in Iraq during the war’s early years, “50,000 is a nice round number, and it’s attractive to [use] 50,000 simply for that reason.” Surprise, surprise: the U.S.’ continued involvement in Middle Eastern politics does more to explain the current force size than military necessity…

According to Collins, the number of troops ready to prevent Iraq from unraveling is closer to 33,000. But even if the unraveling occurs, expect that force to take a back seat to the Iraqi soldiers and police, who have been protecting Iraq’s cities since last June. U.S. troops are “not going back to leading a counterinsurgency again,” Metz assesses. Nor is there any appetite in the Obama administration for re-surging troops to Iraq, as a top White House adviser indicated to Danger Room on Tuesday — something that would probably be necessary if the Iraqis are overwhelmed by a revived insurgency. If it took 150,000 troops years to tamp down the insurgency, 33,000 troops — a figure on its way down to zero — don’t stand much of a chance.

“To be perfectly honest,” Biddle says, “I think the most important function the troops are serving is more psychological than technically, concretely military.”

That is, they’re there in that number as a political reassurance to Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds that the Shiite majority isn’t going to go all Saddam Hussein on them. Even if the U.S. isn’t visible on the streets of Iraqi cities anymore, their nearby presence helps steady Iraq’s shaky post-civil war political balance. It’s like the NATO peacekeeping role in the Balkans, Biddle contends, allowing “the parties to become accustomed to living together without having their minds focused on the moment of [U.S.] withdrawal.” (That’s why Biddle says he’s increasingly worried about the full U.S. pullout next year.)”

The other possibility?

“Metz adds another point. Those 50,000 troops are a check on additional regional meddling in Iraq. The Iraqi military is built around light and mobile forces that can provide internal defense against insurgents. It doesn’t have a large armored corps or a mature air force that can deter an invasion, especially from traditional rival (turned quasi-sponsor) Iran.

For the next year-plus, U.S. troops are a “tripwire, as much of a symbol of commitment as anything,” Metz says. “We do not have the numbers there to actually fight off an invasion, but it’s enough that the U.S. is committed to deter one.”

Good points made by men much smarter than me, but here are my questions:

We can’t undo Iranian infiltration into the Iraqi government, nor have we been effective in reducing their influence. If we are trying to return to the status quo antebellum, our focus should be on the Iraqi government before the Iranian military. How does a contingency force deter an Iranian invasion that could, arguably, be augmented by sympathetic Iraqi militias? Second, if our purpose is to check the rival factions, how long are we prepared to stay there until some sort of national reconciliation can take place? Is Operation New Dawn more than a line in the sand facing both outward and inward? Will some form of the Biden’s vision come true?

Things to think about during the Spring deployment.

There was a great question posed by Foreign Policy‘s Joshua Keating on what the difference is between the upcoming “non-combat troops” in Iraq, and combat troops in Iraq:

Whatever you want them to be. The distinction is more political than military. The White House says the remaining troops will “train and advise Iraqi Security Forces; conduct partnered and targeted counter-terrorism operations; and protect ongoing U.S. civilian and military efforts.” All of this has the potential to involve quite a bit of combat.

I agree that this notion is quite the fantastical assumption. Lest we not forget that MACV (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam) went from 16 “advisers” to 22,000 in under a year before the war “started.” This included fighter pilots getting shot down on strategic bombing and recon missions.

It looks like on the proposed date for the combat-troop pullout on Aug 31 Obama may brush the dust off the infamous “Mission Accomplished” banner. Because we all know how that worked out.

It’s amazing how quickly the quagmire of Iraq has faded from public memory.  Understandably the focus has (finally) shifted to Afghanistan. But as the aforementioned alluded to leader has said: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice… you can’t get fooled again…”

All you serving in Iraq, what do you think? If you’re heading to Iraq after this month, should we still give out right sleeve patches?!

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

News out this week suggests one strategy in fighting the counter terrorism campaign in Afghanistan is being ported from our second theater, Iraq. McClatchy reported this week that special operations forces are funding local militias in the Kunduz and other Eastern provinces in order to supplement regular uniformed Afghan and coalition forces.

This method of using local forces was used in the 2006 Sunni Awakening in Iraq and achieved remarkable results. However, after the initial invasion of Baghdad this similar technique was used quite unwisely — funding ex-Baathist warlords who would appear to operate much the same way.

It would appear this ported method may comeat another crucial time. The AP reports that terrorist attacks are now higher in the Southwest Asian front (read Afghanistan and Pakistan) than in the Middle East (read Iraq). This could be due to terrorist cells restructuring to the shift in Coalition forces from one region to the next, and most likely not a preempted move.

On the heals of a similar surge technique for Afghanistan promised by President Barack Obama, this could present itself as the “Sunni Awakening” of Afghanistan. Once the local militias at least, if not the general population, begins to recognize the legitimacy of American and Coalition efforts, the more responsibility they will be willing to inherit for themselves.

As an elder in this particular militia admitted:

Tensions also are brewing between Shobli elders and the Afghan government. “The government is made up of thieves and mafia men,” Osman said. “We prefer to work for the Americans.”

Enough about Karzai’s distrust of coalition forces lately. Sure, we need him in this fight 100 percent. But what we really need are the people on the ground in this fight, ones like this elder who prefers to work with us. It’s been preached that the Americans and Coalition forces cannot fight a counter insurgency for the Afghans, nor can we win it for them. We can only provide the conditions for which the Afghanistan people fight and win for themselves.

Once they begin to pedal the bike, and we can be comfortable taking our hand of their backs, real progress will roll along.

But hopefully the big-wigs will also avoid repeating mistakes. We must not be too hasty in giving money to every tribal militia that pledges their support. Just like the early stages of paying off local Iraq militias and leaders, our friends need to be fully vetted.

The Army, my friends, has become a learning institution.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger