THE Fighting Illini

Today in the AP is a good point/counter point on the dichotomy of our contemporary generals. Now, I am a fan of Big Stan. He was a soldier’s officer who was one of the most capable ass kickers and name takers out there today.

But Dave has been my hero since the day I pinned my air assault wings back in ’07 and first heard the tall tales of his leadership.

By KIMBERLY DOZIER, Associated Press Writer Kimberly Dozier, Associated Press Writer – Wed Sep 29, 12:34 am ET

LASHKAR GAH, Afghanistan – Gen. David Petraeus trudges across a gravel helicopter landing area with his aides, looking purposeful but a bit grim, as he reaches a village outpost in the violent Afghan province of Helmand. He’s here to chart progress, or lack thereof, in a war that’s running at the pace of a horse cart, in a world that runs at the speed of a text message.

The only time the 57-year-old commander’s smile reaches his eyes are a couple of brief moments when he stops and chats with troops. He poses for snapshots that memorialize his first months in command here, fighting a long war that he knows the American public, not to mention the White House, wants done yesterday.

Petraeus does not snap when a reporter asks him a question he has answered 50 times before, and will at least another 50 this year: Do you see progress?

When he replies, the pressure weighing on him shows in his voice — quieter than when he was in charge at U.S. Central Command in Florida, or earlier in Baghdad and Mosul — and it shows as well in the slightly hunched set of his shoulders, leaning on one arm of the chair.

There is none of the showmanship described in magazine profiles that sketched a megawatt four-star commander who outmaneuvers his adversaries with political and media savvy.

Instead, there is a solemn professor, patiently getting through the next order of business in a day scheduled down to the minute. To answer that “progress” question, he asks his aide for a stack of charts, leafs through to the chosen page, and then walks the reporter through his vision of the war, like a tough calculus problem he keeps having to explain over and over.

Calm, calculating professor. That’s how this war-of-waiting is going to be won. He is the professional officer’s officer. He has kept Stan’s name on the plans he implemented, and that are successful. GEN Petraeus has that sixth political sense to navigate these murky waters.

His leadership is something to be modeled and aspired to. The next time we feel down in our daily grind, just think of the last 10 years of 15-hour days this guy has gone through. GEN Petraeus’ fight is emblematic of the war itself. In his own words:

“I think we’ve pushed it right to the limit,” the general says, “and we stay there.”

He calls the pace “sustainable,” but says quietly, as he shakes hands, “there’s not much of a reserve.”

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

We’ve had a little back-and-forth lately on Operation New Dawn, what it means for us on the ground, and what it means for Iraq.

From Danger Room:

“It’s not clear how rapidly the U.S. will pull those troops out of Iraq ahead of the full December 2011 withdrawal. But for the time being, “in terms of a purely train-and-advise [mission] for a military that’s got its feet on ground, it does seem to be a whole lot,” says Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College.

Adds retired Major General Paul Eaton, who served in Iraq during the war’s early years, “50,000 is a nice round number, and it’s attractive to [use] 50,000 simply for that reason.” Surprise, surprise: the U.S.’ continued involvement in Middle Eastern politics does more to explain the current force size than military necessity…

According to Collins, the number of troops ready to prevent Iraq from unraveling is closer to 33,000. But even if the unraveling occurs, expect that force to take a back seat to the Iraqi soldiers and police, who have been protecting Iraq’s cities since last June. U.S. troops are “not going back to leading a counterinsurgency again,” Metz assesses. Nor is there any appetite in the Obama administration for re-surging troops to Iraq, as a top White House adviser indicated to Danger Room on Tuesday — something that would probably be necessary if the Iraqis are overwhelmed by a revived insurgency. If it took 150,000 troops years to tamp down the insurgency, 33,000 troops — a figure on its way down to zero — don’t stand much of a chance.

“To be perfectly honest,” Biddle says, “I think the most important function the troops are serving is more psychological than technically, concretely military.”

That is, they’re there in that number as a political reassurance to Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds that the Shiite majority isn’t going to go all Saddam Hussein on them. Even if the U.S. isn’t visible on the streets of Iraqi cities anymore, their nearby presence helps steady Iraq’s shaky post-civil war political balance. It’s like the NATO peacekeeping role in the Balkans, Biddle contends, allowing “the parties to become accustomed to living together without having their minds focused on the moment of [U.S.] withdrawal.” (That’s why Biddle says he’s increasingly worried about the full U.S. pullout next year.)”

The other possibility?

“Metz adds another point. Those 50,000 troops are a check on additional regional meddling in Iraq. The Iraqi military is built around light and mobile forces that can provide internal defense against insurgents. It doesn’t have a large armored corps or a mature air force that can deter an invasion, especially from traditional rival (turned quasi-sponsor) Iran.

For the next year-plus, U.S. troops are a “tripwire, as much of a symbol of commitment as anything,” Metz says. “We do not have the numbers there to actually fight off an invasion, but it’s enough that the U.S. is committed to deter one.”

Good points made by men much smarter than me, but here are my questions:

We can’t undo Iranian infiltration into the Iraqi government, nor have we been effective in reducing their influence. If we are trying to return to the status quo antebellum, our focus should be on the Iraqi government before the Iranian military. How does a contingency force deter an Iranian invasion that could, arguably, be augmented by sympathetic Iraqi militias? Second, if our purpose is to check the rival factions, how long are we prepared to stay there until some sort of national reconciliation can take place? Is Operation New Dawn more than a line in the sand facing both outward and inward? Will some form of the Biden’s vision come true?

Things to think about during the Spring deployment.

There was a great question posed by Foreign Policy‘s Joshua Keating on what the difference is between the upcoming “non-combat troops” in Iraq, and combat troops in Iraq:

Whatever you want them to be. The distinction is more political than military. The White House says the remaining troops will “train and advise Iraqi Security Forces; conduct partnered and targeted counter-terrorism operations; and protect ongoing U.S. civilian and military efforts.” All of this has the potential to involve quite a bit of combat.

I agree that this notion is quite the fantastical assumption. Lest we not forget that MACV (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam) went from 16 “advisers” to 22,000 in under a year before the war “started.” This included fighter pilots getting shot down on strategic bombing and recon missions.

It looks like on the proposed date for the combat-troop pullout on Aug 31 Obama may brush the dust off the infamous “Mission Accomplished” banner. Because we all know how that worked out.

It’s amazing how quickly the quagmire of Iraq has faded from public memory.  Understandably the focus has (finally) shifted to Afghanistan. But as the aforementioned alluded to leader has said: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice… you can’t get fooled again…”

All you serving in Iraq, what do you think? If you’re heading to Iraq after this month, should we still give out right sleeve patches?!

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

It seems to me that after eight years of war there are still problematic and catastrophic misconceptions of what we now call “modern warfare,” or in today’s more accurate sense, counter insurgency. With GEN McChrystal focusing the mission in Afghanistan to population-centric counter insurgency and further restricting the ROE, a lot of arm chair generals are questioning our tactics. Not only are they asking the wrong questions, but they’re not even sure of the problems.

My initial disclaimer is that I have yet to get my own first-hand experience. However I think everyone should at least try to know what the big-picture problems are, and have some idea of how to accomplish the mission we are being asked to do.

Recently our troops pulled out of the Korengal Valley in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. It was known as “Death Valley” and over 40 Soldiers were killed defending what was considered a strategic valley in the previous counter terrorism campaign; the valley was seen as a foot hold to harbor and launch terrorists and attacks across the country. Now, the US mission has shifted to counter insurgency, with a focus on doing the most good for larger population centers. Once these peace footholds, if you will, are established, we can help the Afghans spread the peace for themselves.

Many people are claiming this exfil from Death Valley is a sign of defeat, and surely the Taliban would claim the same. It’s been said the Russians only got to the mouth of this valley, and that once we took it we never stopped fighting for it. But does that mean it is because the Taliban beat us?

But here is an excerpt from the last commander in Korangel, as reported by The Washington Post:

But Moretti had been avoiding the Afghan as a way to pressure him into greater cooperation.

“You are the only American commander I have known who refuses to see me,” Khan said in Pashto, his face just inches from Moretti’s. “You are the only one who doesn’t sit at the weekly shura. Why?”

“The shura is a waste of time,” Moretti replied. “All we talk about is dead goats. In 10 months, the meetings haven’t accomplished a single thing.”

He and Khan argued in circles for the next 15 minutes about the violence in the valley before Moretti cut the conversation short.

“I know there are big plans for an attack on one of my bases,” he said. “I want to hear about it.” In exchange for information, Moretti promised to start meeting again with Khan.

Khan weighed the offer and then said, “I don’t know anything.”

The next time Moretti’s men made there way to this village, they were hit by an IED. In my opinion this is a frustrating breach of counter insurgency 101, guilty of both hubris and ethnocentrism. In 10 months all they talked about is goats? I’m pretty sure in the last 10 months in the US all we’ve talked about is Universal Health Care, and the immigration lobbyists are just as disgruntled as CPT Moretti.

Some of us still do not really, intrinsically, understand that to accomplish our counter insurgency mission we must operate in the framework of Afghan society, not US norms.

McChrystal said our troops in Korengal were “an irritant to the people.” In our modern warfare this, not retreat, is what we should consider a defeat. What can we do to wholeheartedly support the local population we are operating in? Should we all be living in FOBs with Burger King and satellite internet while the average Afghan is an illiterate subsistence farmer? These are the questions more commanders need to ask themselves.

As one of my combat-tested friends says, “All you have to do is know how to be a human being. Make friends with ‘em. The problem is not everyone (in the Army) knows how to be a decent human being.”

I’m not saying these Soldiers and Officers don’t know how to be decent humans, I just think my friend’s quote is to the point in his dark, humorous way. Moretti may be the last commander there, but the outcome in that valley was not solely on him. Many commanders came before him, and I’m sure many of them tried to fight their way into the people’s hearts.

Those of us who began our military careers after the start of OEF and OIF, and especially after the 2007 surge in Iraq, should know better. We’ve been ingrained with the tenants of dealing with local populations and the ideas of “non-kinetic fires” and “winning hearts and minds.”

But we need to take these things to the next level. I’m currently reading “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One” by David Kilcullen. His argument is that terrorists are like the Immortals from Ancient Persia — you can’t kill enough of them to win the fight. Terrorists in these small wars don’t fight for grand ideological victories, such as Jihad or an Islamic Caliphate. These are farmers and craftsman who find themselves in a position to fight on their own lands for money, security, or out of fear. By not focusing on the native people of the lands we stomp around on, we are only creating more “enemy combatants.”

There have even been examples of Afghans fighting US forces out of boredom. There was fighting going on in a nearby valley and the residents had nothing better to do in life than take a few pop shots.

When we try to push past the people we are trying to help succeed in life, we are pushing past the true objective. Sure, fighting will take place and we must be proficient in small unit tactics. But we need to continually ask how we can minimize our own fighting and maximize soft power. The troops in Korengal left a bunch of fuel for the locals to use once we left. Good idea. We simply left it there, and once we left the true Jihadists in the area took control of it. Bad idea. Maybe we should have physically distributed it to those villagers? Perhaps we should have done that in the first place. Then when the Korengalis got used to hot water and constantly running generators, they would have helped force out the true terrorists from Death Valley.

I hope more of us can maintain a creative approach to our mission in Afghanistan and continue to take the initiative to solving the big war, our own small wars at a time.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

Here is a great article in this week’s Foreign Policy magazine.

Rather than merely waiting to be the victim of Obama’s timetable, and already knowing that the United States is on its way out, Karzai may have decided to seize the initiative for himself and establish his own timetable for a transition to whatever will come after the United States and NATO withdraw. Establishing himself as independent from the United States will be essential if he is to attract a new great-power patron.

If Karzai’s anti-Western shift accelerates this process, U.S. officials again should not despair. Obama’s decision last December to multiply the commitment of American prestige left no path for a graceful escape. Karzai’s calculated outbursts could open up that means of escape, which Obama should be grateful to have.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger