THE Fighting Illini

News out this week suggests one strategy in fighting the counter terrorism campaign in Afghanistan is being ported from our second theater, Iraq. McClatchy reported this week that special operations forces are funding local militias in the Kunduz and other Eastern provinces in order to supplement regular uniformed Afghan and coalition forces.

This method of using local forces was used in the 2006 Sunni Awakening in Iraq and achieved remarkable results. However, after the initial invasion of Baghdad this similar technique was used quite unwisely — funding ex-Baathist warlords who would appear to operate much the same way.

It would appear this ported method may comeat another crucial time. The AP reports that terrorist attacks are now higher in the Southwest Asian front (read Afghanistan and Pakistan) than in the Middle East (read Iraq). This could be due to terrorist cells restructuring to the shift in Coalition forces from one region to the next, and most likely not a preempted move.

On the heals of a similar surge technique for Afghanistan promised by President Barack Obama, this could present itself as the “Sunni Awakening” of Afghanistan. Once the local militias at least, if not the general population, begins to recognize the legitimacy of American and Coalition efforts, the more responsibility they will be willing to inherit for themselves.

As an elder in this particular militia admitted:

Tensions also are brewing between Shobli elders and the Afghan government. “The government is made up of thieves and mafia men,” Osman said. “We prefer to work for the Americans.”

Enough about Karzai’s distrust of coalition forces lately. Sure, we need him in this fight 100 percent. But what we really need are the people on the ground in this fight, ones like this elder who prefers to work with us. It’s been preached that the Americans and Coalition forces cannot fight a counter insurgency for the Afghans, nor can we win it for them. We can only provide the conditions for which the Afghanistan people fight and win for themselves.

Once they begin to pedal the bike, and we can be comfortable taking our hand of their backs, real progress will roll along.

But hopefully the big-wigs will also avoid repeating mistakes. We must not be too hasty in giving money to every tribal militia that pledges their support. Just like the early stages of paying off local Iraq militias and leaders, our friends need to be fully vetted.

The Army, my friends, has become a learning institution.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

New lieutenants have been conditioned from Day 1 on to expect to be a Platoon Leader. And why not? All of our training during ROTC and OBC (at least for us infantry folk) revolves around that rifle platoon. It’s an exciting job to be a PL, one that many officers look back on as their best time in the Army due to the high level of interaction with your troops. Leading 42 of America’s Finest into combat is the primary goal that you prepare for through 4 years of ROTC, half a year of OBC, Ranger School maybe, until you finally get to your unit.

And then you find out it’s not going to happen… yet.

Maybe they just rotated in a bunch of LTs and you have to wait a few months, maybe you get thrown into a staff section, or maybe they have a more pressing need and you just happen to be the lucky guy to show up right then.

So now what?

In my case, my first job was as a Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST) OIC. This is one of the up and coming positions in the Army; for now it is non-doctrinal and only filled during deployments. It allows for the fusion of intelligence and operations at the Company level to drive operations and fulfill priority intelligence requirements.This job has given me the opportunity to participate in mission planning at the BN/CO level, learn the assets available to support operations overseas and how to request them, yet still go out on patrol everyday and interact with the other PLs, Soldiers, and Iraqis.

In any case, in a short time I will get my shot at being a PL. I believe that while this experience wasn’t along the “ideal” track for an Infantry Officer, it gave me a much better understanding of things that I wouldn’t normally get until I went through MCCC and became a Company Commander. I think in the end it will be a positive enhancer for my career to have experienced something outside the norm.

Several links below detail what the COIST Section is, how it’s structured, and how it will help you as a PL/CO in the future. This is highly recommended reading for any company level leader.

• Infantry Magazine, March-April 2008, by Brandon Colas
• COIST Handbook (AKO access required)

Now, questions to the crowd: What kind of jobs have people had that have been considered outside the normal platoon leader track? How did you approach that? Did you just quit on the Army because the Army screwed you or did you make lemonade out of lemons and drive on? Whats your prospects for PL time? Do you believe it has negatively/positively impacted your career?

D-Rock
1LT, IN
FT Hood, TX