THE Fighting Illini

First off, big ups to my main man Starbuck for his shout-out today. Sir, I’ve been following your blog for awhile, and it’s pretty cool to get that kind of exposure since we can’t rely on print media ::cough:: Spartz! ::cough::

Starbuck’s post on The Lessons of a New Generation [of Army leadership] is worth taking a look at, as it certainly related to a conversation I had with my commander not too long ago. What will happen next in our Army? Granted, every year we lose ironman leaders who probably sympathize with something I recently heard in the Troop:

“We’re war babies…they won’t let us stay. This garrison sh**, we’re just not built for it.”

So where does the current generation of LTs fit into all of this? We enlisted or began our officer education during a time of war. We were told every year by our seasoned, combat-vet cadre, “It’s not a matter of if you go, but when you go.” And now, here we are. Some of us aren’t slated to deploy. Some are in Afghanistan already, some in Iraq. If we stay in, it will be up to our generation to reset the Army after at least a decade of persistent conflict.

Gentlemen, what say you? What are our priorities?

My priorities:

• Refine the way we develop and retain officers.
• Identify talented individuals and develop them into strategic thinkers.

We’ve had a little back-and-forth lately on Operation New Dawn, what it means for us on the ground, and what it means for Iraq.

From Danger Room:

“It’s not clear how rapidly the U.S. will pull those troops out of Iraq ahead of the full December 2011 withdrawal. But for the time being, “in terms of a purely train-and-advise [mission] for a military that’s got its feet on ground, it does seem to be a whole lot,” says Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College.

Adds retired Major General Paul Eaton, who served in Iraq during the war’s early years, “50,000 is a nice round number, and it’s attractive to [use] 50,000 simply for that reason.” Surprise, surprise: the U.S.’ continued involvement in Middle Eastern politics does more to explain the current force size than military necessity…

According to Collins, the number of troops ready to prevent Iraq from unraveling is closer to 33,000. But even if the unraveling occurs, expect that force to take a back seat to the Iraqi soldiers and police, who have been protecting Iraq’s cities since last June. U.S. troops are “not going back to leading a counterinsurgency again,” Metz assesses. Nor is there any appetite in the Obama administration for re-surging troops to Iraq, as a top White House adviser indicated to Danger Room on Tuesday — something that would probably be necessary if the Iraqis are overwhelmed by a revived insurgency. If it took 150,000 troops years to tamp down the insurgency, 33,000 troops — a figure on its way down to zero — don’t stand much of a chance.

“To be perfectly honest,” Biddle says, “I think the most important function the troops are serving is more psychological than technically, concretely military.”

That is, they’re there in that number as a political reassurance to Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds that the Shiite majority isn’t going to go all Saddam Hussein on them. Even if the U.S. isn’t visible on the streets of Iraqi cities anymore, their nearby presence helps steady Iraq’s shaky post-civil war political balance. It’s like the NATO peacekeeping role in the Balkans, Biddle contends, allowing “the parties to become accustomed to living together without having their minds focused on the moment of [U.S.] withdrawal.” (That’s why Biddle says he’s increasingly worried about the full U.S. pullout next year.)”

The other possibility?

“Metz adds another point. Those 50,000 troops are a check on additional regional meddling in Iraq. The Iraqi military is built around light and mobile forces that can provide internal defense against insurgents. It doesn’t have a large armored corps or a mature air force that can deter an invasion, especially from traditional rival (turned quasi-sponsor) Iran.

For the next year-plus, U.S. troops are a “tripwire, as much of a symbol of commitment as anything,” Metz says. “We do not have the numbers there to actually fight off an invasion, but it’s enough that the U.S. is committed to deter one.”

Good points made by men much smarter than me, but here are my questions:

We can’t undo Iranian infiltration into the Iraqi government, nor have we been effective in reducing their influence. If we are trying to return to the status quo antebellum, our focus should be on the Iraqi government before the Iranian military. How does a contingency force deter an Iranian invasion that could, arguably, be augmented by sympathetic Iraqi militias? Second, if our purpose is to check the rival factions, how long are we prepared to stay there until some sort of national reconciliation can take place? Is Operation New Dawn more than a line in the sand facing both outward and inward? Will some form of the Biden’s vision come true?

Things to think about during the Spring deployment.

From NYT:

“The high-profile, large-scale Army bands, of course, remain. Along with the Army Field Band, which tours heavily, they include the United States Army Band, informally known as “Pershing’s Own” or not so informally as Tusab. There are also the United States Military Academy Band and the Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps. The Army has 30 more bands on active duty, as well as 70 Reserve and National Guard bands. All told, it has slots for 4,600 band members.”

h/t to Starbuck

A Brigade’s Worth of Boogie-Woogie Bugle Boys?

Key Quote:

“With a steady increase in the number of generals—a phenomenon Secretary Gates refers to as “brass creep“—comes a natural increase in the number of bands. And calls to reduce bands—however superfluous they might be—will be met with resistance. Consider that division-level bands—which typically cater to the vast majority of funerals and changes of command—are mirrored by even larger Corps- and Army-level bands.”

Happy Labor Day

N. Korea Funk Remix

Editor’s Note: Army Lt. Matt Spartz, a lifelong Lombard resident, was deployed to Afghanistan in May with the 101st Airborne Division. A 2008 journalism graduate of University of Illinois, he is submitting occasional reports for the Daily Herald.

Life on a combat outpost is a modern day Sparta. Far from the “flagpole,” or larger bases with high ranking officers, daily life revolves around one maxim – training for battle.

Without delving too deep into the existential, the similarities are pointed out by nearly every soldier who has experienced this warrior’s haven.

A common misconception about the legendary “300″ at Thermopylae is just that, that there were only 300 warriors. But each warrior had at least three supporters or future warriors with him to carry and service his gear, his food and his medical supplies. One of the books on our brigade’s predeployment reading list was Steven Pressfield’s “Gates of Fire,” which beautifully illustrates the warrior culture of the Spartans and their stand at the Hot Gates. But I never expected the comparisons to our modern battlefield to run so true.

Despite the relatively small size of many outposts, the population is distinctly separated into warriors and their supporters. Like the Spartans, the warriors serve one purpose – to fight their fight. Whether that be standing watch in a guard tower, patrolling the long-forgotten mountain villages, or firing a howitzer cannon, every day’s purpose is to increase the warrior’s proficiency in his fighting tasks.

The supporters may be other soldiers, but they are mainly civilian contractors or local workers hired from nearby villages. There are Russian contractors who keep the water pumps and generators working, Indian contractors who clean the chow hall and bathrooms, and local Afghans who transport trash, build new buildings and help cook the food.

Like the Spartans, the warriors eat, sleep and train together. They wake up early and conduct missions in the dead of night. Their refrigerators are stocked with scientifically formulated Gatorade and protein shakes; their gear is made from sweat-wicking, flame-retardant material; their weapons allow them to see at night.

To local, rail-thin Afghans, we must seem like prototypical Spartans on steroids. We may complain that our Army rations compare to American prison food. But as a chaplain told me after traveling to many outposts in Afghanistan, “There are no small soldiers.” The local workers’ eyes grow wide with wonder when they enter our sacred temples filled with dumbbells and barbells. Their faces are filled with suspicion as to how pieces of forged iron could grow necks and arms so thick, while these warriors still climb their mountains so vigorously.

Every day the warrior stretches his legs to the rosy-fingered dawn; his food is hot, his laundry is ready to be picked up, and fresh ammunition is descending from heaven on fat, white helicopters. All of the supporters exist to ensure that when the enemy knocks at his door, the warrior’s legs are strong, his fingers are as quick as his wits, and the lead is readily available.

There are parts of Afghanistan that I’m sure can be compared to the fight at Thermopylae (holding off insurgents before the evacuation and closing of the remote Combat Outpost Keating, for example). I’m sure more philosophical points can be made comparing the debate over the 2011 proposed draw down to the decision whether to fight the invading Persians (didn’t they visit Afghanistan?).

But the daily, sweaty, dusty life of a Spartan existence at a combat outpost is fairly black and white: Come back with your shield, or on it.

There was a great question posed by Foreign Policy‘s Joshua Keating on what the difference is between the upcoming “non-combat troops” in Iraq, and combat troops in Iraq:

Whatever you want them to be. The distinction is more political than military. The White House says the remaining troops will “train and advise Iraqi Security Forces; conduct partnered and targeted counter-terrorism operations; and protect ongoing U.S. civilian and military efforts.” All of this has the potential to involve quite a bit of combat.

I agree that this notion is quite the fantastical assumption. Lest we not forget that MACV (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam) went from 16 “advisers” to 22,000 in under a year before the war “started.” This included fighter pilots getting shot down on strategic bombing and recon missions.

It looks like on the proposed date for the combat-troop pullout on Aug 31 Obama may brush the dust off the infamous “Mission Accomplished” banner. Because we all know how that worked out.

It’s amazing how quickly the quagmire of Iraq has faded from public memory.  Understandably the focus has (finally) shifted to Afghanistan. But as the aforementioned alluded to leader has said: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice… you can’t get fooled again…”

All you serving in Iraq, what do you think? If you’re heading to Iraq after this month, should we still give out right sleeve patches?!

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

Editor’s Note: Army Lt. Matt Spartz, a lifelong Lombard resident, is a 2008 journalism graduate of University of Illinois. He recently was deployed to Afghanistan with the 101st Airborne Division. From there, he will be submitting occasional reports for the Daily Herald.

The real problem with the war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with rogue generals or defunct, grandiose policy. The real problem has nothing to do with finding the Magic Solution and extolling COIN (counter insurgency) to the far corners of Asia. The real problem is whether the U.S. can decide that the cause is worth doing whatever it takes to finish.

We can “win.” We can make Afghanistan a better place for its citizens. We will come home. But it’s going to take time and money. Do we have enough of both? Yes, if we decide to do whatever it takes.

Some say “bomb ‘em to hell!” and others say we should leave them to their own devices.

Despite U.S. presence, life as usual goes on in the Kunar Valley while a thunderstorm rolls over the mountains.

But we cannot afford to lose sight of the reasoning behind the war. Our nation was attacked by a defined group of terrorists, one that continues to threaten violence within our borders. Unlike previous conflicts directed against the U.S., this group is not a recognized nation or formal coalition. But that does not mean we can afford to ignore them.

People should not confuse the pursuit of the utmost legal, proportionate, and moral action against these “new” threats as weakness, or the inability to overcome a nonstate militia movement. Could we use the extreme, violent tactics of Sherman to wipe out all opposition to the iron will of the U.S.? Of course. If the Taliban et al had a recognizable military, it would be decommissioned by the unrivaled force of joint U.S. military might in less than a week.

Could we button up our borders and hang a “closed” sign on the Statue of Liberty? We sure could, and with units like the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions at the border, Arizona would cease to have an immigration problem.
But we’re better than that. We know the only way to win a moral battle for justice is to take the moral high ground, the classic warfare equivalent of key terrain. The issue is not can we beat the Taliban, but do we have the combined moral wherewithal to do what is necessary in an asymmetrical war of morally right vs. morally wrong.

Regardless of how we got here or why, to think it unworthy to squash a group that bombs its own people, sprays acid in the faces of girls for attending school and uses public hangings and brainwashed human explosives to instill terror is to question all of human morality.

I’m not saying the U.S. has to go in and oust every questionable regime in the world. But there are times in history when a precedent can be set; the pursuit of justice cannot have a price tag. It would be dubious to think during World War II anyone would suggest ways to win the war by spending less, deploying less, and fighting less.

Yes, the U.S. seems to be dabbling in some gray areas, like using unmanned drones for interstate targeted killings. But as the United Nations’ “Report on Targeted Killings” has stated, the international community at large has yet to explicitly state what is black and white in the usage of this new technology and power.

As counter insurgency expert T.E. Lawrence prophetically wrote, learning to fight in this war is like learning to “eat soup with a knife.”

Is the goal of Islamic extremists to have a stable, peaceful Afghanistan? No, it is to destroy Western influence, and the West itself, if necessary. If coalition troops leave Afghanistan will all of our domestic problems go away, and we’ll all be safe and cozy once again? We thought so before Sept. 11, 2001. And the Underwear Bomber is only another example of why we need not think so comfortably from podiums and ballot boxes.

Perhaps it’s not time for people to ask what victory in Afghanistan can do for us, but what else can we do to bring victory to Afghanistan. And in turn, victory for what is right.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

Here is an interesting article for all from Tom Rick’s blog, The Best Defense:

By Maj. Fernando Lujan, U.S. Army
Best Defense guest columnist

I graduated from West Point in 1998, served several combat tours, then received a master’s degree from the Harvard Kennedy School so that I could instruct the cadets in politics, policy, and strategy. I have worked on the West Point faculty for two years, and this summer I’ll return to the operational Army in Afghanistan. From my own limited perspective, I can say that the Academy is falling heartbreakingly short of its potential to prepare young officers.

While West Point has recently made an effort to change with the times by adding a handful of elective courses in counterinsurgency, expanding its foreign immersion programs, and hosting several high level conferences on key Army issues, the founding principle of the cadet system remains the same:  We lecture the cadets on professionalism but we practice bureaucracy.   To summarize the difference, professional cultures debate, discuss, and continually innovate to stay effective in the changing world.  Bureaucracies churn out ever-restrictive rules and seek to capture every eventuality in codified routines.

Consider this:  From day one at the academy every possible situation that a cadet could conceivably encounter is accounted for by strict regulations. Not sure how many inches should be between your coat hangers, whether you can hold your girlfriend’s hand on campus, or how your socks should be marked? Consult the regulations. Moreover, all activity is subjected to the cadet performance system, which essentially assigns a grade to every measurable event in a cadet’s life (think shoe shines, pushups and pop quizzes) then ruthlessly ranks the entire class from first to last. Cadets at the top of the list get the jobs and postings they want after graduation. Those near the bottom end up driving trucks at Fort Polk, Louisiana….

I think more and more people are starting to confront the realities and downfalls of our academy brothers. We heard over and over how ROTC cadets can stand toe-to-toe with USMA, and many times outperform and outlast them in the “real Army.”

I know at least every other new USMA lieutenant I meet is already “done” with the Army, only looking forward to the end of their contract…in five years. I think the restricted education and liberal freedom at the academy is truley burning them out before they even start.

Any other anecdotes?

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

Just in case you all didn’t see it, I am doing a guest column for the Chicago Daily Herald. Here is my second column:

Lombard soldier’s intro to war: 10% violence, 90% excruciating boredom

Editor’s Note: Army Lt. Matt Spartz, a lifelong Lombard resident, is a 2008 journalism graduate at University of Illinois. He recently was deployed to Afghanistan with the 101st Airborne Division. From there, he will be submitting occasional reports for the Daily Herald.

When the suicide bomber and squad of reported Taliban dressed in U.S. Army uniforms used grenades to breach the gate at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, the morning of May 19, my eyes shot open. I pulled one ear out behind my Bose headphones and listened intently, as if my hearing could zoom in like a sniper scope through the thick silence and pick out the specific noise.

After a year of firing more than 2,000 artillery rounds as a fire direction officer at Ft. Campbell, Ky, and multiple combined live fire exercises with our infantry units, I was used to the low thud of indirect fire. But now that I was in Afghanistan, something didn’t feel right about the crunching bass booming so close.

I put the headphones back on and closed my eyes. There was another thud. Then some indistinguishable noise. I slowly opened my eyes this time and looked around the half football field-sized tent with aluminum-framed bunk beds stacked 28 deep, seven wide, with barely 18 inches in between. The sun had yet to crest the jagged mountain peaks that surround the base like a bowl. No one stirred.

At this point I figured some shipping containers were being moved across the base, or someone was getting in some early morning training. Only later would I learn that a group of Taliban on a suicide mission would almost get passed U.S.-trained snipers, wounding nine Americans in the process.

Once the official reports got to the tent where more than 300 other soldiers and I were staying, the collective blood pressure rose. Laptops closed, boots were tied, and magazines of ammunition were passed out.

The only problem was the 68 soldiers in my unit had a collective 12 rounds. The other units weren’t much better off.

A few captains in the tent came up with a hasty plan to pull security around our tent with the combined firepower we had until more information came our way. A group of soldiers were given three rounds a piece and sent to the corners of the concrete slab of our domed tent.

We hurried to our positions, and then we waited. And waited.

A few privates carved tic-tac-toe in the dirt. Others sat at a picnic table in their T-shirts and smoked nonchalantly. The sun was hot and a quick wind blew wispy dark clouds from the north over the snow-capped ridgeline.

Soldiers joked about having to stand guard in buddy teams in order to have enough fire power to take out the enemy.

The next tent over was the local national living quarters, which was a diverse as any Chicago neighborhood. But now anyone not in uniform looked suspicious. Their darting looks and the way they walked around any group of soldiers gave away their new uneasiness with our heightened status.

An hour or so passed by. My stomach growled at the noon sun boasting above. I dreaded the thought of the dining facility staying closed more than the actual threat of a suicide bomber sprinting across the street in front of me, past the 12-foot concrete blast barriers, and taking me with him to meet Allah.

Slowly, more buses appeared on the road; the Kiowa and Apache helicopters were no longer buzzing in circles, and we got the word that we were “all clear.”

Luckily, I thought, it was the middle of the night in the states and no one knows that I’m in the middle of CNN’s breaking news. Then I realized that this was my initiation with the real war, and that it fulfilled the stereotype many people experience — war is 10 percent horrible, frightening violence and 90 percent horrible, excruciating boredom.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

So apparently today is mothers day, which I found hard to believe since today is exactly like yesterday and the day before that, but the calendar did confirm the fact so I guess it’s legit. I didn’t even know that it was mothers day until I walked into the DFAC and they had little signs made up and a special menu to commemorate the day. I found the DFAC “celebration” highly ironic considering that our replacement unit had a half dozen women that got knocked up to avoid the deployment. Now, before I’m branded as a sexist I do understand that unplanned pregnancy happens and I can understand one or two. But seriously, six in one company?! Way to use the Army as another form of welfare. I’d rather do 24 months here than spend 18 years raising a kid that I didn’t even want and only produced as an excuse to get out of something.