THE Fighting Illini

It seems to me that after eight years of war there are still problematic and catastrophic misconceptions of what we now call “modern warfare,” or in today’s more accurate sense, counter insurgency. With GEN McChrystal focusing the mission in Afghanistan to population-centric counter insurgency and further restricting the ROE, a lot of arm chair generals are questioning our tactics. Not only are they asking the wrong questions, but they’re not even sure of the problems.

My initial disclaimer is that I have yet to get my own first-hand experience. However I think everyone should at least try to know what the big-picture problems are, and have some idea of how to accomplish the mission we are being asked to do.

Recently our troops pulled out of the Korengal Valley in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. It was known as “Death Valley” and over 40 Soldiers were killed defending what was considered a strategic valley in the previous counter terrorism campaign; the valley was seen as a foot hold to harbor and launch terrorists and attacks across the country. Now, the US mission has shifted to counter insurgency, with a focus on doing the most good for larger population centers. Once these peace footholds, if you will, are established, we can help the Afghans spread the peace for themselves.

Many people are claiming this exfil from Death Valley is a sign of defeat, and surely the Taliban would claim the same. It’s been said the Russians only got to the mouth of this valley, and that once we took it we never stopped fighting for it. But does that mean it is because the Taliban beat us?

But here is an excerpt from the last commander in Korangel, as reported by The Washington Post:

But Moretti had been avoiding the Afghan as a way to pressure him into greater cooperation.

“You are the only American commander I have known who refuses to see me,” Khan said in Pashto, his face just inches from Moretti’s. “You are the only one who doesn’t sit at the weekly shura. Why?”

“The shura is a waste of time,” Moretti replied. “All we talk about is dead goats. In 10 months, the meetings haven’t accomplished a single thing.”

He and Khan argued in circles for the next 15 minutes about the violence in the valley before Moretti cut the conversation short.

“I know there are big plans for an attack on one of my bases,” he said. “I want to hear about it.” In exchange for information, Moretti promised to start meeting again with Khan.

Khan weighed the offer and then said, “I don’t know anything.”

The next time Moretti’s men made there way to this village, they were hit by an IED. In my opinion this is a frustrating breach of counter insurgency 101, guilty of both hubris and ethnocentrism. In 10 months all they talked about is goats? I’m pretty sure in the last 10 months in the US all we’ve talked about is Universal Health Care, and the immigration lobbyists are just as disgruntled as CPT Moretti.

Some of us still do not really, intrinsically, understand that to accomplish our counter insurgency mission we must operate in the framework of Afghan society, not US norms.

McChrystal said our troops in Korengal were “an irritant to the people.” In our modern warfare this, not retreat, is what we should consider a defeat. What can we do to wholeheartedly support the local population we are operating in? Should we all be living in FOBs with Burger King and satellite internet while the average Afghan is an illiterate subsistence farmer? These are the questions more commanders need to ask themselves.

As one of my combat-tested friends says, “All you have to do is know how to be a human being. Make friends with ‘em. The problem is not everyone (in the Army) knows how to be a decent human being.”

I’m not saying these Soldiers and Officers don’t know how to be decent humans, I just think my friend’s quote is to the point in his dark, humorous way. Moretti may be the last commander there, but the outcome in that valley was not solely on him. Many commanders came before him, and I’m sure many of them tried to fight their way into the people’s hearts.

Those of us who began our military careers after the start of OEF and OIF, and especially after the 2007 surge in Iraq, should know better. We’ve been ingrained with the tenants of dealing with local populations and the ideas of “non-kinetic fires” and “winning hearts and minds.”

But we need to take these things to the next level. I’m currently reading “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One” by David Kilcullen. His argument is that terrorists are like the Immortals from Ancient Persia — you can’t kill enough of them to win the fight. Terrorists in these small wars don’t fight for grand ideological victories, such as Jihad or an Islamic Caliphate. These are farmers and craftsman who find themselves in a position to fight on their own lands for money, security, or out of fear. By not focusing on the native people of the lands we stomp around on, we are only creating more “enemy combatants.”

There have even been examples of Afghans fighting US forces out of boredom. There was fighting going on in a nearby valley and the residents had nothing better to do in life than take a few pop shots.

When we try to push past the people we are trying to help succeed in life, we are pushing past the true objective. Sure, fighting will take place and we must be proficient in small unit tactics. But we need to continually ask how we can minimize our own fighting and maximize soft power. The troops in Korengal left a bunch of fuel for the locals to use once we left. Good idea. We simply left it there, and once we left the true Jihadists in the area took control of it. Bad idea. Maybe we should have physically distributed it to those villagers? Perhaps we should have done that in the first place. Then when the Korengalis got used to hot water and constantly running generators, they would have helped force out the true terrorists from Death Valley.

I hope more of us can maintain a creative approach to our mission in Afghanistan and continue to take the initiative to solving the big war, our own small wars at a time.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger