THE Fighting Illini

News out this week suggests one strategy in fighting the counter terrorism campaign in Afghanistan is being ported from our second theater, Iraq. McClatchy reported this week that special operations forces are funding local militias in the Kunduz and other Eastern provinces in order to supplement regular uniformed Afghan and coalition forces.

This method of using local forces was used in the 2006 Sunni Awakening in Iraq and achieved remarkable results. However, after the initial invasion of Baghdad this similar technique was used quite unwisely — funding ex-Baathist warlords who would appear to operate much the same way.

It would appear this ported method may comeat another crucial time. The AP reports that terrorist attacks are now higher in the Southwest Asian front (read Afghanistan and Pakistan) than in the Middle East (read Iraq). This could be due to terrorist cells restructuring to the shift in Coalition forces from one region to the next, and most likely not a preempted move.

On the heals of a similar surge technique for Afghanistan promised by President Barack Obama, this could present itself as the “Sunni Awakening” of Afghanistan. Once the local militias at least, if not the general population, begins to recognize the legitimacy of American and Coalition efforts, the more responsibility they will be willing to inherit for themselves.

As an elder in this particular militia admitted:

Tensions also are brewing between Shobli elders and the Afghan government. “The government is made up of thieves and mafia men,” Osman said. “We prefer to work for the Americans.”

Enough about Karzai’s distrust of coalition forces lately. Sure, we need him in this fight 100 percent. But what we really need are the people on the ground in this fight, ones like this elder who prefers to work with us. It’s been preached that the Americans and Coalition forces cannot fight a counter insurgency for the Afghans, nor can we win it for them. We can only provide the conditions for which the Afghanistan people fight and win for themselves.

Once they begin to pedal the bike, and we can be comfortable taking our hand of their backs, real progress will roll along.

But hopefully the big-wigs will also avoid repeating mistakes. We must not be too hasty in giving money to every tribal militia that pledges their support. Just like the early stages of paying off local Iraq militias and leaders, our friends need to be fully vetted.

The Army, my friends, has become a learning institution.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

It seems to me that after eight years of war there are still problematic and catastrophic misconceptions of what we now call “modern warfare,” or in today’s more accurate sense, counter insurgency. With GEN McChrystal focusing the mission in Afghanistan to population-centric counter insurgency and further restricting the ROE, a lot of arm chair generals are questioning our tactics. Not only are they asking the wrong questions, but they’re not even sure of the problems.

My initial disclaimer is that I have yet to get my own first-hand experience. However I think everyone should at least try to know what the big-picture problems are, and have some idea of how to accomplish the mission we are being asked to do.

Recently our troops pulled out of the Korengal Valley in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. It was known as “Death Valley” and over 40 Soldiers were killed defending what was considered a strategic valley in the previous counter terrorism campaign; the valley was seen as a foot hold to harbor and launch terrorists and attacks across the country. Now, the US mission has shifted to counter insurgency, with a focus on doing the most good for larger population centers. Once these peace footholds, if you will, are established, we can help the Afghans spread the peace for themselves.

Many people are claiming this exfil from Death Valley is a sign of defeat, and surely the Taliban would claim the same. It’s been said the Russians only got to the mouth of this valley, and that once we took it we never stopped fighting for it. But does that mean it is because the Taliban beat us?

But here is an excerpt from the last commander in Korangel, as reported by The Washington Post:

But Moretti had been avoiding the Afghan as a way to pressure him into greater cooperation.

“You are the only American commander I have known who refuses to see me,” Khan said in Pashto, his face just inches from Moretti’s. “You are the only one who doesn’t sit at the weekly shura. Why?”

“The shura is a waste of time,” Moretti replied. “All we talk about is dead goats. In 10 months, the meetings haven’t accomplished a single thing.”

He and Khan argued in circles for the next 15 minutes about the violence in the valley before Moretti cut the conversation short.

“I know there are big plans for an attack on one of my bases,” he said. “I want to hear about it.” In exchange for information, Moretti promised to start meeting again with Khan.

Khan weighed the offer and then said, “I don’t know anything.”

The next time Moretti’s men made there way to this village, they were hit by an IED. In my opinion this is a frustrating breach of counter insurgency 101, guilty of both hubris and ethnocentrism. In 10 months all they talked about is goats? I’m pretty sure in the last 10 months in the US all we’ve talked about is Universal Health Care, and the immigration lobbyists are just as disgruntled as CPT Moretti.

Some of us still do not really, intrinsically, understand that to accomplish our counter insurgency mission we must operate in the framework of Afghan society, not US norms.

McChrystal said our troops in Korengal were “an irritant to the people.” In our modern warfare this, not retreat, is what we should consider a defeat. What can we do to wholeheartedly support the local population we are operating in? Should we all be living in FOBs with Burger King and satellite internet while the average Afghan is an illiterate subsistence farmer? These are the questions more commanders need to ask themselves.

As one of my combat-tested friends says, “All you have to do is know how to be a human being. Make friends with ‘em. The problem is not everyone (in the Army) knows how to be a decent human being.”

I’m not saying these Soldiers and Officers don’t know how to be decent humans, I just think my friend’s quote is to the point in his dark, humorous way. Moretti may be the last commander there, but the outcome in that valley was not solely on him. Many commanders came before him, and I’m sure many of them tried to fight their way into the people’s hearts.

Those of us who began our military careers after the start of OEF and OIF, and especially after the 2007 surge in Iraq, should know better. We’ve been ingrained with the tenants of dealing with local populations and the ideas of “non-kinetic fires” and “winning hearts and minds.”

But we need to take these things to the next level. I’m currently reading “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One” by David Kilcullen. His argument is that terrorists are like the Immortals from Ancient Persia — you can’t kill enough of them to win the fight. Terrorists in these small wars don’t fight for grand ideological victories, such as Jihad or an Islamic Caliphate. These are farmers and craftsman who find themselves in a position to fight on their own lands for money, security, or out of fear. By not focusing on the native people of the lands we stomp around on, we are only creating more “enemy combatants.”

There have even been examples of Afghans fighting US forces out of boredom. There was fighting going on in a nearby valley and the residents had nothing better to do in life than take a few pop shots.

When we try to push past the people we are trying to help succeed in life, we are pushing past the true objective. Sure, fighting will take place and we must be proficient in small unit tactics. But we need to continually ask how we can minimize our own fighting and maximize soft power. The troops in Korengal left a bunch of fuel for the locals to use once we left. Good idea. We simply left it there, and once we left the true Jihadists in the area took control of it. Bad idea. Maybe we should have physically distributed it to those villagers? Perhaps we should have done that in the first place. Then when the Korengalis got used to hot water and constantly running generators, they would have helped force out the true terrorists from Death Valley.

I hope more of us can maintain a creative approach to our mission in Afghanistan and continue to take the initiative to solving the big war, our own small wars at a time.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

To continue on the thread of career management, what should you do if you’re fed up with your current job? Find a new one.

It is possible to change units before you hit your normal PCS checkpoint, which is when you head to MCCC, at approximately the 3.5-4.5 year mark of your career. While simple in theory, it is very uncommon and requires a bit of legwork on your part to get it accomplished.

Several options exist that I’m aware of for LTs, in order of difficulty

• Changing units to a different post
• Ranger Battalion
• Long Range Surveillance Company
• Old Guard
• Changing units at your current post
• Filling other shortages listed on your Branch HRC page (for example, IN 1LTs can currently volunteer to deploy to be a Aide-de-camp, TF Paladin Team Leader, and LNO to ISAF).
• Volunteering to be a Basic Training XO/CDR or Warrior Transition Unit XO

Generally speaking, each of these will require approval from your Battalion and Brigade Commanders, successful time as a platoon leader already, letter(s) of recommendation, and very successful AERs/OERs in the past. They usually involve an interview/try-out, and can be highly competitive. Changing units on the same post, to try to go to one that is deploying for example, is most likely the easiest course of action, while trying to get PCS orders to a new unit (other then Ranger/Old Guard) will be the most difficult; HRC has a policy against moving people that quickly after arriving at a new unit. Trying to get out of a unit to avoid a deployment is almost guaranteed to fail.

If you want to go to a deploying unit at your current post (for example, if you’re not slated to go anywhere for a while), you would need to get in touch with that unit’s commanders and S1 and see if they have a slot for you to fill. If they do, then you’d have to go through the process of getting released from your current unit, and orders cut to transfer you over to your new unit.

Several issues I ran into – if you’re good enough to compete for a slot, your BN commander may not want to release you. Your BN and BDE S1s will also be involved and don’t have a lot of experience with releasing LTs, so continuous follow up is necessary. Just recognize that the Army Bureaucracy is a formidable foe and things move at a glacial speed with regard to the paperwork, but all things good are worth waiting for.

As for me, I’m just waiting on my orders next week to take me to my new unit, and I started the process about 1 1/2 months ago. If anyone has any questions feel free to post in comments, or if you want more specific details, I’ll talk with you offline about it.

D-Rock
1LT, IN
FT Hood, TX

Here is a great article in this week’s Foreign Policy magazine.

Rather than merely waiting to be the victim of Obama’s timetable, and already knowing that the United States is on its way out, Karzai may have decided to seize the initiative for himself and establish his own timetable for a transition to whatever will come after the United States and NATO withdraw. Establishing himself as independent from the United States will be essential if he is to attract a new great-power patron.

If Karzai’s anti-Western shift accelerates this process, U.S. officials again should not despair. Obama’s decision last December to multiply the commitment of American prestige left no path for a graceful escape. Karzai’s calculated outbursts could open up that means of escape, which Obama should be grateful to have.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

I would like to start out by saying I believe in the officer corps. I still believe in the Army. We (the Army and officers) get a lot of bad press both from the outside and ourselves. We like to point out what’s wrong with the system, but not many are willing to stick around to fix things. And I think that is, in actuality, the biggest problem right now.

I’m an optimist and an altruist. I know I personally got into this job because of the hooah-hooah jump out of helicopters stuff, and because of the prestigious legacy of the services. Even in the modern era of persistent conflict, eight years into two wars, the general public still looks at military officers as the country’s most honorable and professional individuals. Sure, on paper we may not represent the true creme de la creme. But there is something to be said about some brains, a little brawn, and a healthy dose of enough patriotism to throw in your lot and do your part, to call us some of the best individuals America has to count on. Numbers alone tell more lies than truths.

But unfortunately, like any job, one must start at the bottom and work his way up.

Like me writing this at 0253 HRS while on a tiring staff duty shift. No one joins the Army to pull staff duty. No one joins the Army to write counselings, work on chapter packets even on your block leave, or to be separated from your friends and family for months at a time. At some point we all recognized we had something more to give than ourselves, and inspired by the war stories of our predecessors we raised our hands for whatever the task.

If you wanted to branch infantry and the Army Gods decided you were going to be field artillery, what do you do? Quit? Did you join the Army with any preconditions? I try to tell myself I didn’t. It doesn’t always work. If you raised your hand to volunteer and the Army decided it needed you most in the supply room, take it with a grain of salt. Only a small fraction can jump out of helicopters and kick down doors. But no one can jump out of helicopters before that LZ is prepped, and that chalk is loaded with beans and bullets.

Usually when I talk to lieutenants choosing to leave the Army before making captain, or as a junior captain, it definitely is because of many of the issues mentioned in the Strategic Studies paper (job satisfaction, not meeting job expectations or opportunities, etc). But I just can’t help but think at some point near the field grade things really start paying off. I can’t help thinking that the only ones willing to find that out are some of those less desirable candidates who can’t separate from the military because they lack the motivation to leave or the skills to leave an institutionalized career.

The Army is trying to entice us with “just stick it out!” and we promise things will get better. It truly is a hard sell.

We are all blanketed in the glory of the Washingtons, Shermans, Pattons and Moores. But this glory does extend to our era in the Powells, McChrystals, Patreas’s and…Stenzels. I believe junior officers feel too detatched from these echelons, so it’s hard to think that what we do now could one day lead to command at that level or careers of that significance. Most of the stars we look up to either never saw “combat” until they commanded a corps, or still haven’t seen “combat.” In todays’ Army we consider anyone with a fuzzy right sleeve not worth the nylon his name tape is printed with. No one really writes books about how amazing their lieutenant years were if they’ve made it past captain. And lately the draw from the civilian sector, these loosening standards for admission into the officer corps, and the less kinetic battlefields discourage retention in a generation that needs quick satisfaction.

Most of the lieutenants I talk to who plan on staying in for at least the foreseeable future don’t have much introspection or high ambition. The talk is mostly of punching in the hours, minimizing the impact of the next deployment, and securing school dates to relax from OP Tempo. I haven’t decided if this is good or not, or whether it even means anything. But I would at least think that some of the great field grades and generals in the past tried to plan for the future, even as lieutenants. I don’t believe that officers accidentally end up with PhD’s and Pentagon jobs. That takes more than punching the clock.

For me the draw to see what’s on the other side of the lieutenant hill is just too great. I can see myself trying to do different jobs in intel or civil affairs, or even artillery (fires, as we like to call it these days). I think we always hear about the jobs we’d like to do, but many of us never meet the people who either have done it or can tell us how to get into it. This is probably another problem with the system, that of the branch managers as the gate keepers. Perhaps there needs to be a more fluid communication system between real, working field grades and junior officers. Like a facebook or LinkedIn where random communication and job recommendations is encouraged. Ha!

I know my experiences thus far have not been what I expected. We are trained in ROTC to have a platoon of cadet-competent “Soldiers” who think like us, do PT for fun and we WILL take the hill! Our pre-job training is focused on Soldiering ourselves up and learning tactics. Our on-the-job experiences teach us logistics and how to apply the grease that gets the Army machine to the fight foremost, then we’ll worry about making the PowerPoint for the OPORD to cordon the village.

I know there are also legitimate circumstances that make some of us want, or need, to leave the military when our time is up. I also strongly believe that anyone who has done their time has already done more than they were asked. There is a reason LTC’s will regularly thank soldiers and junior officers for their service.

I personally refuse to let this discourage my outlook. Perhaps something better in the future will present itself. I still don’t plan on making this a 20-year career. But I can see myself putting in a few more than my three-year contract if not only to see what else the Army can do for me, but what I can do for the Army.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger