THE Fighting Illini

Editor’s Note: Army Lt. Matt Spartz, a lifelong Lombard resident, was deployed to Afghanistan in May with the 101st Airborne Division. A 2008 journalism graduate of University of Illinois, he is submitting occasional reports for the Daily Herald.

Life on a combat outpost is a modern day Sparta. Far from the “flagpole,” or larger bases with high ranking officers, daily life revolves around one maxim – training for battle.

Without delving too deep into the existential, the similarities are pointed out by nearly every soldier who has experienced this warrior’s haven.

A common misconception about the legendary “300″ at Thermopylae is just that, that there were only 300 warriors. But each warrior had at least three supporters or future warriors with him to carry and service his gear, his food and his medical supplies. One of the books on our brigade’s predeployment reading list was Steven Pressfield’s “Gates of Fire,” which beautifully illustrates the warrior culture of the Spartans and their stand at the Hot Gates. But I never expected the comparisons to our modern battlefield to run so true.

Despite the relatively small size of many outposts, the population is distinctly separated into warriors and their supporters. Like the Spartans, the warriors serve one purpose – to fight their fight. Whether that be standing watch in a guard tower, patrolling the long-forgotten mountain villages, or firing a howitzer cannon, every day’s purpose is to increase the warrior’s proficiency in his fighting tasks.

The supporters may be other soldiers, but they are mainly civilian contractors or local workers hired from nearby villages. There are Russian contractors who keep the water pumps and generators working, Indian contractors who clean the chow hall and bathrooms, and local Afghans who transport trash, build new buildings and help cook the food.

Like the Spartans, the warriors eat, sleep and train together. They wake up early and conduct missions in the dead of night. Their refrigerators are stocked with scientifically formulated Gatorade and protein shakes; their gear is made from sweat-wicking, flame-retardant material; their weapons allow them to see at night.

To local, rail-thin Afghans, we must seem like prototypical Spartans on steroids. We may complain that our Army rations compare to American prison food. But as a chaplain told me after traveling to many outposts in Afghanistan, “There are no small soldiers.” The local workers’ eyes grow wide with wonder when they enter our sacred temples filled with dumbbells and barbells. Their faces are filled with suspicion as to how pieces of forged iron could grow necks and arms so thick, while these warriors still climb their mountains so vigorously.

Every day the warrior stretches his legs to the rosy-fingered dawn; his food is hot, his laundry is ready to be picked up, and fresh ammunition is descending from heaven on fat, white helicopters. All of the supporters exist to ensure that when the enemy knocks at his door, the warrior’s legs are strong, his fingers are as quick as his wits, and the lead is readily available.

There are parts of Afghanistan that I’m sure can be compared to the fight at Thermopylae (holding off insurgents before the evacuation and closing of the remote Combat Outpost Keating, for example). I’m sure more philosophical points can be made comparing the debate over the 2011 proposed draw down to the decision whether to fight the invading Persians (didn’t they visit Afghanistan?).

But the daily, sweaty, dusty life of a Spartan existence at a combat outpost is fairly black and white: Come back with your shield, or on it.

There was a great question posed by Foreign Policy‘s Joshua Keating on what the difference is between the upcoming “non-combat troops” in Iraq, and combat troops in Iraq:

Whatever you want them to be. The distinction is more political than military. The White House says the remaining troops will “train and advise Iraqi Security Forces; conduct partnered and targeted counter-terrorism operations; and protect ongoing U.S. civilian and military efforts.” All of this has the potential to involve quite a bit of combat.

I agree that this notion is quite the fantastical assumption. Lest we not forget that MACV (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam) went from 16 “advisers” to 22,000 in under a year before the war “started.” This included fighter pilots getting shot down on strategic bombing and recon missions.

It looks like on the proposed date for the combat-troop pullout on Aug 31 Obama may brush the dust off the infamous “Mission Accomplished” banner. Because we all know how that worked out.

It’s amazing how quickly the quagmire of Iraq has faded from public memory.  Understandably the focus has (finally) shifted to Afghanistan. But as the aforementioned alluded to leader has said: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice… you can’t get fooled again…”

All you serving in Iraq, what do you think? If you’re heading to Iraq after this month, should we still give out right sleeve patches?!

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

Editor’s Note: Army Lt. Matt Spartz, a lifelong Lombard resident, is a 2008 journalism graduate of University of Illinois. He recently was deployed to Afghanistan with the 101st Airborne Division. From there, he will be submitting occasional reports for the Daily Herald.

The real problem with the war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with rogue generals or defunct, grandiose policy. The real problem has nothing to do with finding the Magic Solution and extolling COIN (counter insurgency) to the far corners of Asia. The real problem is whether the U.S. can decide that the cause is worth doing whatever it takes to finish.

We can “win.” We can make Afghanistan a better place for its citizens. We will come home. But it’s going to take time and money. Do we have enough of both? Yes, if we decide to do whatever it takes.

Some say “bomb ‘em to hell!” and others say we should leave them to their own devices.

Despite U.S. presence, life as usual goes on in the Kunar Valley while a thunderstorm rolls over the mountains.

But we cannot afford to lose sight of the reasoning behind the war. Our nation was attacked by a defined group of terrorists, one that continues to threaten violence within our borders. Unlike previous conflicts directed against the U.S., this group is not a recognized nation or formal coalition. But that does not mean we can afford to ignore them.

People should not confuse the pursuit of the utmost legal, proportionate, and moral action against these “new” threats as weakness, or the inability to overcome a nonstate militia movement. Could we use the extreme, violent tactics of Sherman to wipe out all opposition to the iron will of the U.S.? Of course. If the Taliban et al had a recognizable military, it would be decommissioned by the unrivaled force of joint U.S. military might in less than a week.

Could we button up our borders and hang a “closed” sign on the Statue of Liberty? We sure could, and with units like the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions at the border, Arizona would cease to have an immigration problem.
But we’re better than that. We know the only way to win a moral battle for justice is to take the moral high ground, the classic warfare equivalent of key terrain. The issue is not can we beat the Taliban, but do we have the combined moral wherewithal to do what is necessary in an asymmetrical war of morally right vs. morally wrong.

Regardless of how we got here or why, to think it unworthy to squash a group that bombs its own people, sprays acid in the faces of girls for attending school and uses public hangings and brainwashed human explosives to instill terror is to question all of human morality.

I’m not saying the U.S. has to go in and oust every questionable regime in the world. But there are times in history when a precedent can be set; the pursuit of justice cannot have a price tag. It would be dubious to think during World War II anyone would suggest ways to win the war by spending less, deploying less, and fighting less.

Yes, the U.S. seems to be dabbling in some gray areas, like using unmanned drones for interstate targeted killings. But as the United Nations’ “Report on Targeted Killings” has stated, the international community at large has yet to explicitly state what is black and white in the usage of this new technology and power.

As counter insurgency expert T.E. Lawrence prophetically wrote, learning to fight in this war is like learning to “eat soup with a knife.”

Is the goal of Islamic extremists to have a stable, peaceful Afghanistan? No, it is to destroy Western influence, and the West itself, if necessary. If coalition troops leave Afghanistan will all of our domestic problems go away, and we’ll all be safe and cozy once again? We thought so before Sept. 11, 2001. And the Underwear Bomber is only another example of why we need not think so comfortably from podiums and ballot boxes.

Perhaps it’s not time for people to ask what victory in Afghanistan can do for us, but what else can we do to bring victory to Afghanistan. And in turn, victory for what is right.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

Here is an interesting article for all from Tom Rick’s blog, The Best Defense:

By Maj. Fernando Lujan, U.S. Army
Best Defense guest columnist

I graduated from West Point in 1998, served several combat tours, then received a master’s degree from the Harvard Kennedy School so that I could instruct the cadets in politics, policy, and strategy. I have worked on the West Point faculty for two years, and this summer I’ll return to the operational Army in Afghanistan. From my own limited perspective, I can say that the Academy is falling heartbreakingly short of its potential to prepare young officers.

While West Point has recently made an effort to change with the times by adding a handful of elective courses in counterinsurgency, expanding its foreign immersion programs, and hosting several high level conferences on key Army issues, the founding principle of the cadet system remains the same:  We lecture the cadets on professionalism but we practice bureaucracy.   To summarize the difference, professional cultures debate, discuss, and continually innovate to stay effective in the changing world.  Bureaucracies churn out ever-restrictive rules and seek to capture every eventuality in codified routines.

Consider this:  From day one at the academy every possible situation that a cadet could conceivably encounter is accounted for by strict regulations. Not sure how many inches should be between your coat hangers, whether you can hold your girlfriend’s hand on campus, or how your socks should be marked? Consult the regulations. Moreover, all activity is subjected to the cadet performance system, which essentially assigns a grade to every measurable event in a cadet’s life (think shoe shines, pushups and pop quizzes) then ruthlessly ranks the entire class from first to last. Cadets at the top of the list get the jobs and postings they want after graduation. Those near the bottom end up driving trucks at Fort Polk, Louisiana….

I think more and more people are starting to confront the realities and downfalls of our academy brothers. We heard over and over how ROTC cadets can stand toe-to-toe with USMA, and many times outperform and outlast them in the “real Army.”

I know at least every other new USMA lieutenant I meet is already “done” with the Army, only looking forward to the end of their contract…in five years. I think the restricted education and liberal freedom at the academy is truley burning them out before they even start.

Any other anecdotes?

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

Just in case you all didn’t see it, I am doing a guest column for the Chicago Daily Herald. Here is my second column:

Lombard soldier’s intro to war: 10% violence, 90% excruciating boredom

Editor’s Note: Army Lt. Matt Spartz, a lifelong Lombard resident, is a 2008 journalism graduate at University of Illinois. He recently was deployed to Afghanistan with the 101st Airborne Division. From there, he will be submitting occasional reports for the Daily Herald.

When the suicide bomber and squad of reported Taliban dressed in U.S. Army uniforms used grenades to breach the gate at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, the morning of May 19, my eyes shot open. I pulled one ear out behind my Bose headphones and listened intently, as if my hearing could zoom in like a sniper scope through the thick silence and pick out the specific noise.

After a year of firing more than 2,000 artillery rounds as a fire direction officer at Ft. Campbell, Ky, and multiple combined live fire exercises with our infantry units, I was used to the low thud of indirect fire. But now that I was in Afghanistan, something didn’t feel right about the crunching bass booming so close.

I put the headphones back on and closed my eyes. There was another thud. Then some indistinguishable noise. I slowly opened my eyes this time and looked around the half football field-sized tent with aluminum-framed bunk beds stacked 28 deep, seven wide, with barely 18 inches in between. The sun had yet to crest the jagged mountain peaks that surround the base like a bowl. No one stirred.

At this point I figured some shipping containers were being moved across the base, or someone was getting in some early morning training. Only later would I learn that a group of Taliban on a suicide mission would almost get passed U.S.-trained snipers, wounding nine Americans in the process.

Once the official reports got to the tent where more than 300 other soldiers and I were staying, the collective blood pressure rose. Laptops closed, boots were tied, and magazines of ammunition were passed out.

The only problem was the 68 soldiers in my unit had a collective 12 rounds. The other units weren’t much better off.

A few captains in the tent came up with a hasty plan to pull security around our tent with the combined firepower we had until more information came our way. A group of soldiers were given three rounds a piece and sent to the corners of the concrete slab of our domed tent.

We hurried to our positions, and then we waited. And waited.

A few privates carved tic-tac-toe in the dirt. Others sat at a picnic table in their T-shirts and smoked nonchalantly. The sun was hot and a quick wind blew wispy dark clouds from the north over the snow-capped ridgeline.

Soldiers joked about having to stand guard in buddy teams in order to have enough fire power to take out the enemy.

The next tent over was the local national living quarters, which was a diverse as any Chicago neighborhood. But now anyone not in uniform looked suspicious. Their darting looks and the way they walked around any group of soldiers gave away their new uneasiness with our heightened status.

An hour or so passed by. My stomach growled at the noon sun boasting above. I dreaded the thought of the dining facility staying closed more than the actual threat of a suicide bomber sprinting across the street in front of me, past the 12-foot concrete blast barriers, and taking me with him to meet Allah.

Slowly, more buses appeared on the road; the Kiowa and Apache helicopters were no longer buzzing in circles, and we got the word that we were “all clear.”

Luckily, I thought, it was the middle of the night in the states and no one knows that I’m in the middle of CNN’s breaking news. Then I realized that this was my initiation with the real war, and that it fulfilled the stereotype many people experience — war is 10 percent horrible, frightening violence and 90 percent horrible, excruciating boredom.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

So apparently today is mothers day, which I found hard to believe since today is exactly like yesterday and the day before that, but the calendar did confirm the fact so I guess it’s legit. I didn’t even know that it was mothers day until I walked into the DFAC and they had little signs made up and a special menu to commemorate the day. I found the DFAC “celebration” highly ironic considering that our replacement unit had a half dozen women that got knocked up to avoid the deployment. Now, before I’m branded as a sexist I do understand that unplanned pregnancy happens and I can understand one or two. But seriously, six in one company?! Way to use the Army as another form of welfare. I’d rather do 24 months here than spend 18 years raising a kid that I didn’t even want and only produced as an excuse to get out of something.

News out this week suggests one strategy in fighting the counter terrorism campaign in Afghanistan is being ported from our second theater, Iraq. McClatchy reported this week that special operations forces are funding local militias in the Kunduz and other Eastern provinces in order to supplement regular uniformed Afghan and coalition forces.

This method of using local forces was used in the 2006 Sunni Awakening in Iraq and achieved remarkable results. However, after the initial invasion of Baghdad this similar technique was used quite unwisely — funding ex-Baathist warlords who would appear to operate much the same way.

It would appear this ported method may comeat another crucial time. The AP reports that terrorist attacks are now higher in the Southwest Asian front (read Afghanistan and Pakistan) than in the Middle East (read Iraq). This could be due to terrorist cells restructuring to the shift in Coalition forces from one region to the next, and most likely not a preempted move.

On the heals of a similar surge technique for Afghanistan promised by President Barack Obama, this could present itself as the “Sunni Awakening” of Afghanistan. Once the local militias at least, if not the general population, begins to recognize the legitimacy of American and Coalition efforts, the more responsibility they will be willing to inherit for themselves.

As an elder in this particular militia admitted:

Tensions also are brewing between Shobli elders and the Afghan government. “The government is made up of thieves and mafia men,” Osman said. “We prefer to work for the Americans.”

Enough about Karzai’s distrust of coalition forces lately. Sure, we need him in this fight 100 percent. But what we really need are the people on the ground in this fight, ones like this elder who prefers to work with us. It’s been preached that the Americans and Coalition forces cannot fight a counter insurgency for the Afghans, nor can we win it for them. We can only provide the conditions for which the Afghanistan people fight and win for themselves.

Once they begin to pedal the bike, and we can be comfortable taking our hand of their backs, real progress will roll along.

But hopefully the big-wigs will also avoid repeating mistakes. We must not be too hasty in giving money to every tribal militia that pledges their support. Just like the early stages of paying off local Iraq militias and leaders, our friends need to be fully vetted.

The Army, my friends, has become a learning institution.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

It seems to me that after eight years of war there are still problematic and catastrophic misconceptions of what we now call “modern warfare,” or in today’s more accurate sense, counter insurgency. With GEN McChrystal focusing the mission in Afghanistan to population-centric counter insurgency and further restricting the ROE, a lot of arm chair generals are questioning our tactics. Not only are they asking the wrong questions, but they’re not even sure of the problems.

My initial disclaimer is that I have yet to get my own first-hand experience. However I think everyone should at least try to know what the big-picture problems are, and have some idea of how to accomplish the mission we are being asked to do.

Recently our troops pulled out of the Korengal Valley in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. It was known as “Death Valley” and over 40 Soldiers were killed defending what was considered a strategic valley in the previous counter terrorism campaign; the valley was seen as a foot hold to harbor and launch terrorists and attacks across the country. Now, the US mission has shifted to counter insurgency, with a focus on doing the most good for larger population centers. Once these peace footholds, if you will, are established, we can help the Afghans spread the peace for themselves.

Many people are claiming this exfil from Death Valley is a sign of defeat, and surely the Taliban would claim the same. It’s been said the Russians only got to the mouth of this valley, and that once we took it we never stopped fighting for it. But does that mean it is because the Taliban beat us?

But here is an excerpt from the last commander in Korangel, as reported by The Washington Post:

But Moretti had been avoiding the Afghan as a way to pressure him into greater cooperation.

“You are the only American commander I have known who refuses to see me,” Khan said in Pashto, his face just inches from Moretti’s. “You are the only one who doesn’t sit at the weekly shura. Why?”

“The shura is a waste of time,” Moretti replied. “All we talk about is dead goats. In 10 months, the meetings haven’t accomplished a single thing.”

He and Khan argued in circles for the next 15 minutes about the violence in the valley before Moretti cut the conversation short.

“I know there are big plans for an attack on one of my bases,” he said. “I want to hear about it.” In exchange for information, Moretti promised to start meeting again with Khan.

Khan weighed the offer and then said, “I don’t know anything.”

The next time Moretti’s men made there way to this village, they were hit by an IED. In my opinion this is a frustrating breach of counter insurgency 101, guilty of both hubris and ethnocentrism. In 10 months all they talked about is goats? I’m pretty sure in the last 10 months in the US all we’ve talked about is Universal Health Care, and the immigration lobbyists are just as disgruntled as CPT Moretti.

Some of us still do not really, intrinsically, understand that to accomplish our counter insurgency mission we must operate in the framework of Afghan society, not US norms.

McChrystal said our troops in Korengal were “an irritant to the people.” In our modern warfare this, not retreat, is what we should consider a defeat. What can we do to wholeheartedly support the local population we are operating in? Should we all be living in FOBs with Burger King and satellite internet while the average Afghan is an illiterate subsistence farmer? These are the questions more commanders need to ask themselves.

As one of my combat-tested friends says, “All you have to do is know how to be a human being. Make friends with ‘em. The problem is not everyone (in the Army) knows how to be a decent human being.”

I’m not saying these Soldiers and Officers don’t know how to be decent humans, I just think my friend’s quote is to the point in his dark, humorous way. Moretti may be the last commander there, but the outcome in that valley was not solely on him. Many commanders came before him, and I’m sure many of them tried to fight their way into the people’s hearts.

Those of us who began our military careers after the start of OEF and OIF, and especially after the 2007 surge in Iraq, should know better. We’ve been ingrained with the tenants of dealing with local populations and the ideas of “non-kinetic fires” and “winning hearts and minds.”

But we need to take these things to the next level. I’m currently reading “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One” by David Kilcullen. His argument is that terrorists are like the Immortals from Ancient Persia — you can’t kill enough of them to win the fight. Terrorists in these small wars don’t fight for grand ideological victories, such as Jihad or an Islamic Caliphate. These are farmers and craftsman who find themselves in a position to fight on their own lands for money, security, or out of fear. By not focusing on the native people of the lands we stomp around on, we are only creating more “enemy combatants.”

There have even been examples of Afghans fighting US forces out of boredom. There was fighting going on in a nearby valley and the residents had nothing better to do in life than take a few pop shots.

When we try to push past the people we are trying to help succeed in life, we are pushing past the true objective. Sure, fighting will take place and we must be proficient in small unit tactics. But we need to continually ask how we can minimize our own fighting and maximize soft power. The troops in Korengal left a bunch of fuel for the locals to use once we left. Good idea. We simply left it there, and once we left the true Jihadists in the area took control of it. Bad idea. Maybe we should have physically distributed it to those villagers? Perhaps we should have done that in the first place. Then when the Korengalis got used to hot water and constantly running generators, they would have helped force out the true terrorists from Death Valley.

I hope more of us can maintain a creative approach to our mission in Afghanistan and continue to take the initiative to solving the big war, our own small wars at a time.

"Strength does not come from winning. Your struggles develop your strength. When you go through hardship and decide not to surrender, that is strength."

-Arnold Schwarzenegger

To continue on the thread of career management, what should you do if you’re fed up with your current job? Find a new one.

It is possible to change units before you hit your normal PCS checkpoint, which is when you head to MCCC, at approximately the 3.5-4.5 year mark of your career. While simple in theory, it is very uncommon and requires a bit of legwork on your part to get it accomplished.

Several options exist that I’m aware of for LTs, in order of difficulty

• Changing units to a different post
• Ranger Battalion
• Long Range Surveillance Company
• Old Guard
• Changing units at your current post
• Filling other shortages listed on your Branch HRC page (for example, IN 1LTs can currently volunteer to deploy to be a Aide-de-camp, TF Paladin Team Leader, and LNO to ISAF).
• Volunteering to be a Basic Training XO/CDR or Warrior Transition Unit XO

Generally speaking, each of these will require approval from your Battalion and Brigade Commanders, successful time as a platoon leader already, letter(s) of recommendation, and very successful AERs/OERs in the past. They usually involve an interview/try-out, and can be highly competitive. Changing units on the same post, to try to go to one that is deploying for example, is most likely the easiest course of action, while trying to get PCS orders to a new unit (other then Ranger/Old Guard) will be the most difficult; HRC has a policy against moving people that quickly after arriving at a new unit. Trying to get out of a unit to avoid a deployment is almost guaranteed to fail.

If you want to go to a deploying unit at your current post (for example, if you’re not slated to go anywhere for a while), you would need to get in touch with that unit’s commanders and S1 and see if they have a slot for you to fill. If they do, then you’d have to go through the process of getting released from your current unit, and orders cut to transfer you over to your new unit.

Several issues I ran into – if you’re good enough to compete for a slot, your BN commander may not want to release you. Your BN and BDE S1s will also be involved and don’t have a lot of experience with releasing LTs, so continuous follow up is necessary. Just recognize that the Army Bureaucracy is a formidable foe and things move at a glacial speed with regard to the paperwork, but all things good are worth waiting for.

As for me, I’m just waiting on my orders next week to take me to my new unit, and I started the process about 1 1/2 months ago. If anyone has any questions feel free to post in comments, or if you want more specific details, I’ll talk with you offline about it.

D-Rock
1LT, IN
FT Hood, TX